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Abstract. Ideologies face two critical problems in the reality, 
the problem of commitment and the problem of validation. 
Commitment and validation are two separate phenomena, in 
spite of the near universal myth that the human is committed 
because his beliefs are valid. Ideologies not only seem external 
and valid but also worth whatever discomforts believing entails. 
In this paper the authors develop a theory of social commitment 
and social validation using concepts of validation of neutro-
sophic logic.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
      Ideologies are systems of abstract thought applied to 
public matters and thus make this concept central to poli-
tics. Ideology is not the same thing as Philosophy. Phi-
losophy is a way of living life, while ideology is an al-
most ideal way of life for society. Some attribute to ide-
ology positive characteristics like vigor and fervor, or 
negative features like excessive certitude and fundamen-
talist rigor. The word ideology is most often found in 
political discourse; there are many different kinds of 
ideology: political, social, epistemic, ethical, and so on. 
Karl Marx [1] proposes an economic base superstruc-
ture model of society (See Figure 1). The base refers to 
the means of production of society. The superstructure is 
formed on top of the base, and comprises that society's 
ideology, as well as its legal system, political system, and 
religions. For Marx, the base determines the superstruc-
ture. Because the ruling class controls the society's means 
of production, the superstructure of society, including its 
ideology, will be determined according to what is in the 
ruling class's best interests. Therefore the ideology of a 
society is of enormous importance since it confuses the 
alienated groups and can create false consciousness. 
Minar [2] describes six different ways in which the 
word "ideology" has been used: 
1. As a collection of certain ideas with certain
kinds of content, usually normative;
2. As the form or internal logical structure that
ideas have within a set;
3. By the role in which ideas play in human-social
interaction;
4. By the role that ideas play in the structure of an
organization;
5. As meaning, whose purpose is persuasion; and
6. As the locus of social interaction, possibly.
Althusser [3] proposed a materialistic conception of 
ideology. A number of propositions, which are never un-
true, suggest a number of other propositions, which are, 
in this way, the essence of the lacunar discourse is what 
is not told (but is suggested). For example, the statement 
all are equal before the law, which is a theoretical 
groundwork of current legal systems, suggests that all 
people may be of equal worth or have equal opportuni-
ties. This is not true, for the concept of private property 
over the means of production results in some people be-
ing able to own more than others, and their property 
brings power and influence. Marxism itself is frequently 
described as ideology, in the sense in which a negative 
connotation is attached to the word; that is, that Marxism 
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is a closed system of ideas which maintains itself in the 
face of contrary experience. Any social view must con-
tain an element of ideology, since an entirely objective 
and supra-historical view of the world is unattainable. 
Further, by its very scope and strength, Marxism lends it-
self to transformation into a closed and self-justifying 
system of assertions. 
For Mullins [4], an ideology is composed of four basic 
characteristics: 
1. It must have power over cognitions;
2. It must be capable of guiding one's evaluations;
3. It must provide guidance towards action;
4. And, as stated above, must be logically coher-
ent.
Mullins emphasizes that an ideology should be con-
trasted with the related (but different) issues of utopia 
and historical myth. For Zvi Lamm [5] an ideology is a 
system of assumptions with which people identify. These 
assumptions organize, direct and sustain people's voli-
tional and purposive behaviour. The assumptions on 
which an ideology is based are not collected at random 
but constitute an organized and systematic structure. An 
ideology is a belief system which explains the nature of 
the world and man’s place in it. It explains the nature of 
man and the derivative relationships of humans to one 
another. 
Mi Park [6] writes, “Ideology is the main medium 
with which conscious human beings frame and re-frame 
their lived experience. Accumulated memories and expe-
riences of struggle, success and failure in the past influ-
ence one’s choice of ideological frame”. In according to 
Cranston [7] an ideology is a form of social or political 
philosophy in which practical elements are as prominent 
as theoretical ones. A system of ideas aspires both to ex-
plain the world and to change it. Therefore, the main pur-
pose behind an ideology is to offer change in society 
through a normative thought process. For Duncker [8] the 
term ideology is defined in terms of a system of presenta-
tions that explicitly or implicitly claim to absolute truth.  
Ideas may be good, true, or beautiful in some context 
of meaning but their goodness, truth, or beauty is not suf-
ficient explanation for its existence, sharedness, or per-
petuation through time. Ideology is the ground and tex-
ture of cultural consensus. In its narrowest sense, this 
may be a consensus of a marginal or maverick group. In 
the broad sense in which we use the term ideology is the 
system of interlinked ideas, symbols, and beliefs by 
which any culture seeks to justify and perpetuate itself; 
the web of rhetoric, ritual, and assumption through which 
society coerces, persuades, and coheres. Therefore:  
1) An Ideology is a system of related ideas (learned
and shared) related to each other, which has
some permanence, and to which individuals 
and/or human groups exhibit some commitment.  
2) Ideology is a system of concepts and views,
which serves to make sense of the world while
obscuring the social interest that are expressed
therein, and by completeness and relative inter-
nal consistency tends to form a closed belief
system and maintain itself in the face of contra-
dictory or inconsistent experience.
3) All ideology has the function of constituting
concrete individuals as subjects (Althusser, [3]).
Conventional conceptions of author (authority, origi-
nator) and individual agent are replaced by the ideologi-
cally constituted actor subject. Stereotypes, that actor 
subject rely on to understand and respond to events. As 
much if the Philosophy, Political or Religion is doxical 
reflected of economic relations as if they express in a 
specific language certain mental model of human rela-
tions, or an update of a certain field of a common struc-
ture to society, only be closed the debate after a theoreti-
cal treatment.  
Nevertheless, theoretical treatment of all ideology 
firstly has to be located to synchronism level. Relation 
between synchronous and diachronic order is complicat-
ed when we are located in a unique level:  the structure of 
a social system and transformations are homogenous 
among them.  In the case of synchrony are constructed 
static or dynamic models. In the diachronic case we will 
have to consider History, content multiform movement 
making take part heterogeneous elements. Ideology 
emerges spontaneously at every level of society, and 
simply expresses the existing structure of the Social Sys-
tem. Members of every class construct their own under-
standing of the social system, based on their personal ex-
periences. Since those experiences are primarily of capi-
talist social relations, their ideology tends to reflect the 
norms of capitalist society. The individual subject is 
faced, not with the problem of differentiating the ideolog-
ical from the real, but with the problem of choosing be-
tween competing ideological versions of the real. Draw-
ing on Jaques Lacan's theory in which human subjectivity 
is formed through a process of misrecognition of the ide-
ology in the mirror of language.  
This is far from the only theory of economics to be 
raised to ideology status - some notable economically-
based ideologies include mercantilism, mixed economy, 
social Darwinism, communism, laissez-faire economics, 
free trade, ecologism, Islamic fundamentalism, etc. Sci-
ence is an ideology in itself. Therefore, while the scien-
tific method is itself an ideology, as it is a collection of 
ideas, there is nothing particularly wrong or bad about it. 
In everything what affects the study of the ideologies the 
problem has a double sense:   
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1) Homogeneity: each discourse informs a content
previously given and that puts under its own
syntaxes.
2) Heterogeneity: passage of the reality to lan-
guages introduces a complete displacement of
all the notions, fact that excludes the cause that
they are conceived like simple duplicates.
In Deontical Impure Systems (DIS) 1  approach, the
Superstructure of Social System has been divided in two 
([9-20]):  
1) Doxical Superstructure (DS) is formed by val-
ues in fact, political and religious ideologies and
culture of a human society in a certain historical
time.
2) Mythical Superstructure (MS) also has been di-
vides in two parts:
a) MS1 containing the mythical compo-
nents or primigenial bases of the ideo-
logies and cultures with the ideal val-
ues.
b) MS2 containing ideal values and utopi-
as that are ideal wished and unattaina-
1 Impure sets are sets whose referential elements (abso-
lute beings) are not counted as abstract objects and have 
the following conditions: a) They are real (material or 
energetic absolute beings). b) They exist independently 
of the Subject. c) S develops p-significances on them. d) 
True things can be said about them. e) Subject can know 
these true things about them. f) They have properties that 
support a robust notion of mathematical truth. A simple 
impure system-linkage Σ (M, R) is a semiotic system 
consisting of the pair formed by an impure object set M 
the elements of which are p-significances (relative be-
ings) of entities belonging to Reality (absolute beings) or 
certain attributes of these, and a set of binary relations, 
such that R  P(M x M) =  P(M2). That isr  R/r  M 
XM being   , x / ,i j i jr x y M M x y M   . An
impure system-linkage defined within an impure object 
set M is a simple system S = (M, R) or a finite union of 
simple systems-linkage Σ = ni=1 Σ i such that Σ i are sim-
ple systems.  This shall be denoted as Σ  (M, R) such 
that R  P(finiteM
2). A Deontical system is an organiza-
tion of knowledge on the part of the subject S that fulfils 
the following ones:  a) Other subjects (human beings) are 
elements of the system. b) Some existing relations be-
tween elements have Deontic modalities.  c) There is 
purpose (purposes) ([9-17], [20]).   
ble goals of belief systems of the Doxi-
cal Superstructure (DS).   
It is summarized these ideas in the following diagram 
(Figure 1): 
Ideological Doxical 
Superstructure 
 (IDS) 
Values in fact, Dominant Ideology, 
Primigenial Base (PB) 
 Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(materialization)
Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  Ideal Values, Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
denotative image (IDS-image). 
denotative-MS-projectio
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
Structural 
Base
[t0 ,tn ] Structural 
Base
[tn,t m]
Figure 1: Deontical Impure Systems (DIS) approach
The following elements ([20-21]) are listed in the or-
der that would be logically required for the understand-
ing a first approach of an ideology. This does not imply 
priority in value or in causal or historical sense. 
1) Values. Implicitly or explicitly, ideologies de-
fine what is good or valuable. We refer to ideal
values belonging to Mythical Superstructure
(MS). They are goals in the sense that they are
the values in terms of which values in fact be-
longing to Doxical Superstructure (DS) are jus-
tified. Ideal values tend to be abstract summar-
ies of the behavioral attributes which social sys-
tem rewards, formulated after the fact. Social
groups think of themselves, however, as setting
out to various things in order to implement their
values. Values are perceived as a priori, when
they are in fact a posteriori to action. Having
abstracted a ideal value from social experience
in SB, a social group may then reverse the pro-
cess by deriving a new course of action from
the principle. At the collective level of social
structure (SB), this is analogous to the capacity
for abstract thought in individual subjects and
allows great (or not) flexibility in adapting to
events. Concrete ideologies often substitute ob-
servable social events for the immeasurable ab-
stract ideal values to give the values in fact im-
mediate social utility.
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2) Substantive beliefs (Sb) [2]. They are the more
important and basic beliefs of an ideology.
Statements such as: all the power for the peo-
ple, God exists, Black is Beautiful, and so on,
comprise the actual content of the ideologies
and may take almost any form. For the believ-
ers, substantive beliefs are the focus of interest.
3) Orientation. The believer may assume the ex-
istence of a framework of assumptions around
his thought, it may not actually exist. The orien-
tation he shares with other believers may be il-
lusory. For example, consider almost any politic
and sociologic ideology. Such system evolves
highly detailed and highly systematic doctrines
long after they come into existence and that
they came into existence of rather specific sub-
stantive beliefs. The believers interact, share
specific consensuses, and give themselves a
specific name: Marxism, socialism, Nazism,
etc. Then, professionals of this ideology work
out an orientation, logic, sets of criteria of va-
lidity, and so forth.
4) Language. It is the logic of an ideology. Lan-
guage L of an ideology is the logical rules
which relates one substantive2 belief ([12-17],
[20]) to another within the ideology. Language
must be inferred from regularities in the way of
a set of substantives beliefs in the way a set of
beliefs is used. The language will be implicit,
and it may not be consistently applied. Let Sb
be a substantive belief. We propose the follow-
ing rules of generation of ideologies:
  














&5
,&4
Pr3
?2
tanPr1
1
R
nTTR
ArgedTR
forwhatandwhygoalhypothesisArgR
SbSbbeliefstivesubsedR
n
j
n
k
k
 
Argument is formed by the sum of two charac-
teristics: hypothesis, that is to say, so that this 
physical and social reality?   And goal:  as we 
2 Substantive beliefs ([14-15], [20]) constitute the axioms 
of the system, while many of derived beliefs will consti-
tute their theorems.  
want is this society to reach its "perfection" 
(utopia).   
5) Perspective. Perspective of an ideology or their
cognitive map, is the set of conceptual tools.
Central in most perspectives is some statement
of where the ideology and/or social group that
carries it stands in relation to other things, spe-
cially nature, social events or other social
groups. Are we equals? Enemies? Rulers?
Friends? Perspective as description of the so-
cial environment is a description of the social
group itself, and the place of each individual in
it. The perspective may be stated as a myth in
the Mythical Superstructure ([16-17], [20]). It
explains not only who subjects are and how
subjects came to be in cognitive terms, but also
why subject exist in terms of ideal values.
Meaning (d-significances


Ds )3 and identifica-
tion are provided along with cognitive orienta-
tion. 
6) Prescriptions and proscriptions. This includes
action alternatives or policy recommendations
as well as deontical norms for behavior. They
are the connotative-SB-projection from IDS to
SB (see figure 1). Historical examples of pre-
scriptions are the Marx’s Communist Manifesto,
the Lenin’s What is To Be Done or the Hitler’s
Mein Kampf. Deontical norms represent the
cleanest connection through of MS-image and
SB-projections between the abstract idea (in
Ideal Structure belonging to Mythical Super-
structure) and the concrete applied belief be-
cause they refer to behavior that is observable.
They are the most responsive conditions in be-
ing directly carried by the social group through
the mechanisms of social reward and punish-
ment.
3 Denotation (d-s) is the literal, obvious definition or the 
common sense of the significance of a sign.  We denote s 
to the systemic significance being a denotative signifi-
cance.  ζ is the set of significant (signs) of Reality and ζΣ 
to the set of systemic significants, e.g. the part of signs 
that have been limited by the Subject when establishing 
the borders of the system, and so that ζΣ   ζ . Denota-
tive systemic significance (d-s) sΣ is a function defined in 
 so that if   then     s .Denotative sys-
temic significance (d-significance) is the significance of 
the absolute beings. Denotative systemic significance (d-
significance) agrees with relative beings. 
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7) Ideological Technology. In according Borhek
and Curtis (1983) every ideology contains asso-
ciated beliefs concerning means to attain ideal
values. Some such associated beliefs concern
the subjective legitimacy or appropriateness of
d-significances, while others concern only the
effectiveness of various d-significances. For ex-
ample, political activists and organizational
strategy and tactics are properly called technol-
ogy of the ideology. Ideological Technology is
the associated beliefs and material tools provid-
ing means for the immediate (in Structural Base)
or far (In Ideal Structure as Utopia) goals of an
ideology. Ideological Technology is not used to
justify or validated other elements of an ideolo-
gy, although the existence of ideological tech-
nologies may limit alternative among substan-
tive beliefs. Ideological Technology commands
less commitment from believers than do the oth-
er elements. A change in Ideological Technolo-
gy (strategy) may be responsible for changes in
logical prior elements of an ideology. Ideologi-
cal Technology, like belonging to Structural
Base and having a series of prescriptions con-
cerning doing can influence the life conditions
of believers, thus forcing an adaptation in the
ideology itself. Eurocomunism in Western Eu-
rope gives to a good historical example. Ideo-
logical Technology may become symbolic
through DS-image and an inverse MS-image on
Primigenial Base belonging to Mythical Super-
structure, and it can cause of more fundamental
differences between ideologies and, therefore, a
source of conflict. Conflicts between anarchists
and Communists in the Spanish Civil War or the
ideas of Trotsky and those of Stalin in the USSR
are examples of it. Much blood has been shed
between Muslims and Hindus over the fact that
their religions have different dietary restrictions
(deontical prohibitions).
Then: 
1) Conflicts are not over Ideological Technology
but over what technological difference symbol-
izes in the Primigenial Base of the Mythical Su-
perstructure.
2) Substantive beliefs are understood only in terms
of ideal values, criteria of validity, language and
perspective.
3) The believer is usually better able to verbalize
substantive beliefs than he is values, criteria,
logical principles or orientation, which is apt to
be the unquestioned bases from which he pro-
ceeds.
4) Ideal values, criteria of validity, language and
perspective may have been built up around a
substantive belief to give it significance and jus-
tification.  
Based on these criteria and our DIS approach, we are 
able to propose the following definition of ideology: 
Definition 1 We define systemically as ideology and we 
represent as IRSbId , to the system formed by an 
object set Sb whose elements are substantive beliefs 
  niSbSb i ,...,1,  and whose relational ser IR is 
formed by the set of binary logical abstract relations be-
tween substantive beliefs. 
2 VALIDATION OF IDEOLOGIES 
Ideologies face two critical problems in the reality, 
the problem of commitment and the problem of valida-
tion. Ideologies persist because they and/or the social ve-
hicle that carry them are able to generate and maintain 
commitment. For commitment to be maintained, howev-
er, an ideology must also, independently, seem to valid. 
Commitment and validation are two separate phenomena, 
in spite of the near universal myth that the human is 
committed because his beliefs are valid. Ideologies not 
only seem external and valid but also worth whatever 
discomforts believing entails. Humans often take the 
trouble to validate their beliefs because they are commit-
ted to them. An ideology with high utility limits available 
alternative ideology by excluding them, and limitation of 
alternatives increases the utility of whatever one has left. 
Utility for a group is not always identical to individual 
utility that motivates group reinforcement. Insofar as hu-
mans must collaborate to attain specific goals, they must 
compromise with collective utilities. Groups retain or 
change ideologies according to the history of reinforce-
ment.  
By virtue of its structure (within the Doxical Superstruc-
ture DS), an ideology may be able to fend off negative 
evidence in a given stimuli social environment H’ but 
experience difficulty as social conditions (within Struc-
tural Base SB) change (See figure 1). Ideologies may re-
spond to a changing social environment not only with ad-
justments in the social vehicles that carry those (Social 
States), but also with changes in the ideological logic 
(Semiotic States). Consider the possibilities that are open 
when an ideology is challenged by stimuli: 
1) The ideology may be discarded, or at least the
level commitment reduced.
2) The ideology may be affirmed in the very teeth
of stimuli (the triumph of faith).
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3) The believers may deny that the stimuli (events)
were relevant to the ideology, or that the sub-
stantive belief that was changelled was im-
portantly related to the rest of ideology.
The validation of belief is a largely social process. 
The social power of ideology depends on its external 
quality. Ideologies seem, to believers, to transcend the 
social groups that carry them, to have an independent ex-
istence of their own ([21-22]). For ideologies to persist 
must not only motivate commitment through collective 
utility but also through making the ideology itself seem 
to be valid in its own right. Perceived consensus is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the social pow-
er of ideologies. Therefore ideological validation is not 
simply a matter of organizational devices for the mainte-
nance of believer commitment, but also of the social ar-
rangements wherever the abstract system of ideology is 
accorded validity in terms of its own criteria. The appro-
priate criteria for determining validity or invalidity are 
socially defined. Logic and proofs are just as much so-
cial products as the ideologies they validate.  
Cyclical principle of validation: An idea is valid if 
it objectively passes the criterion of validity itself. 
Conditions of validation: 
1) Social condition: Criterion of validity is chosen
consensually and it is applied through a series
of social conventions (Berger and Luckmann,
1966). 
2) First nonsocial condition: Ideology has a logic
of its own, which may not lead where powerful
members of the social group wanted to.
3) Second nonsocial condition: The pressure of
events (physical or semiotic stimuli coming
from the stimulus social environment H’) that
may be pressure on believers to relinquish an
ideology. For an ideology to survive the pres-
sure of events with enough member commit-
ment to make it powerful it must receive valida-
tion beyond the level of more consensuses.
The pressure of the events is translated in form deno-
tative significances as DS-images on the component sub-
jects of the Dogmatic System of the set of believers be-
longing to Structural Base.   
Main Principle of validation: The power of an ide-
ology depends on its ability to validate itself in the face 
of reason for doubt.  
The internal evidence of an ideology (IE) is the data 
which derive from the ideology itself or from a social 
group or organization to which is attached. For highly 
systematic belief system (an ideology), any attack upon 
any of its principles is an attack upon the system itself. 
Then: 
1) If one of the basic propositions (substantive be-
liefs) of an ideology is brought under attack,
then so the entire ideology. In consequence, an
ideology is at the mercy of its weakest elements.
2) An ideology has powerful conceptual properties,
but those very properties highlight the smallest
disagreement and give it importance in its logi-
cal connections with other items of ideology.
3) Even if an ideology is entirely nonempirical, it
is vulnerable because even one shaken belief can
lead to the loss of commitment to the entire ide-
ological structure.
4) An ideology as the religious ideologies, with
relatively little reference to the empirical world
cannot be much affected by external empirical
relevance, simply because the events do not bear
upon it. The essential substantive belief in the
mercy of God can scarcely be challenged by the
continued wretchedness of life.
5) Nevertheless, concrete ideologies are directly
subject to both internal and external evidence.
6) The abstract ideology is protected from external
evidence by its very nature. A cult under fire
may be able to preserve its ideology only by re-
treating to abstraction. Negative external evi-
dence may motivate system-building at the level
of the abstract ideology, where internal evidence
is far more important.
7) The separibility of the abstract ideology from its
concrete expression depends on the ability of
believers no affiliated with the association (cult
and/or concern) that carried it socially to under-
stand and use it, that is to say, subjects belong-
ing to the Structural Base.
8) If the validation of an ideology comes from em-
pirical events and the ability to systematically
relate propositions according to an internally
consistent logic, it can be reconstructed and per-
petual by any social group with only a few hints.
9) The adaptation of an ideology is some sort of
compromise between the need of consensual
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validation and the need for independence from 
the associations that carries it. 
Consensual validation is the confirmation of reality 
by comparison of one's own perceptions and concerns 
with those of others, including the recognition and modi-
fication of distortions. Consensual validation, describes 
the process by which human being realize that their per-
ceptions of the world are shared by others.  This bolsters 
their self-confidence since the confirmation of their ob-
servations normalizes their experience. Consensual vali-
dation also applies to our meanings and definitions.  Ar-
riving at a consensus of what things mean facilitates 
communication and understanding. When we all agree 
what something is, the definition of that something has 
integrity.  Reality is a matter of consensual validation 
([23]). Our exact internal interpretations of all objects 
may differ somewhat, but we agree on the generic class 
enough to communicate meaningfully with each other. 
Phantasy can be, and often is, as real as the "real world." 
Reality is distorted by strong, conflicted needs. People 
seek affiliations with groups that enable them to maintain 
an ideal balance between the desires to fit in and stand 
out. These motives operate in dialectical opposition to 
each other, such that meeting one signal a deficit in the 
other and instigate increased efforts to reduce this deficit. 
Thus, whereas feelings of belonging instigate attempts to 
individuate one, feelings of uniqueness instigate attempts 
to re-embed oneself in the collective. The physicalistic 
accretion to this rule of consensual validation is that, 
physical data being the only "real" data, internal phenom-
ena must be reduced to physiological or behavioural data 
to become reliable or they will be ignored entirely. Public 
observation, then, always refers to a limited, specially 
trained public. It is only by basic agreement among those 
specially trained people that data become accepted as a 
foundation for the development of a science. That laymen 
cannot replicate the observations is of little relevance. 
What is so deceptive about the state of mind of the mem-
bers of a society is the "consensual validation" of their 
concepts. It is naively assumed that the fact that the ma-
jority of people share certain ideas and feelings proves 
the validity of these ideas and feelings. Nothing is further 
from the truth.  
Consensual validation as such has no bearing whatso-
ever on human reason.  Just as there is a "folie a deux" 
there is a "folie a millions." The fact that millions of peo-
ple share the same vices does not make these vices vir-
tues and the fact that they share so many errors does not 
make the errors to be truths ([25]). On the other hand, 
when the ideology is identified with the community (or 
with a consensus), and this community, as well, it is not 
truly identified with a true socio-political institution 
based on the land (nation), but with a transcendental 
principle, personified in the norms of a church, sect or 
another type of messianic organization, its effects on the 
secular political body, within as it prospers but with 
which it is not identified, they are inevitable and predict-
able destructive. The process of consensual validation, 
then ties the content of ideological beliefs to the social 
order (existing in the Structural Base) itself. It is estab-
lished a feedback process: 1) If the social order remains, 
then the ideological beliefs must somehow be valid, re-
gardless of the pressure of the events. 2) If the ideologi-
cal beliefs are agreed upon by all, then the social order is 
safe.   
Commitment of believers is the resultant of two op-
posite forces. 
1) Social support (associations and no militant people),
which maintains ideology.
2) Problems posed by pressure of events, which threat-
en ideology.
When ideology is shaken, further evidence of consen-
sus is required. This can provide by social rituals of vari-
ous sorts, which may have any manifest content, but 
which act to convey the additional messages ([23]). Each 
member of a believer group, in publicly himself through 
ritual is rewarded by the public commitment of the oth-
ers. Patriotic ceremonies, political meetings, manifesta-
tions by the streets of the cities, transfers and public reli-
gious ceremonies are classic examples of this. Such cer-
emonies typically involve a formal restatement of the 
ideal ideology in speeches, as well as rituals that give op-
portunities for individual reaffirmation of commitment. 
For Durkheim ([21]) ideological behaviour could be ren-
dered sociologically intelligible by assuming an identity 
between societies and the object of worship. The ideal of 
all totalitarian ideology is the total identity between the 
civil society and the ideological thought, that is to say, 
the establishment of the unique thought without fissures. 
Thus consensual validation and validation according to 
abstract ideal (Ideal Mythical Superstructure) are indis-
tinguishable in the extreme case. If a certain ideology has 
a sole raison d’être affirmation of group membership 
(fundamentalist ideologies), no amount of logical or em-
pirical proof is even relevant to validation, though proofs 
may in fact be emphasized as part of the ritual of group 
life.  
We have the following examples of consensual validation 
in actual ideologies. :  
1) False patriotism is the belief that whatever gov-
ernment says goes.
2) Neo-conservatism is the belief that the status
quo should be maintained.
3) Radical Progressism is the belief that the social
reality can change undermining the foundations
of a millenarian culture.
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4) Shallow utilitarianism is whatever the majority
says goes, and since the majority, that’s what
shallow utilitarian believe in. This is often called
groupthink. Erich Fromm ([25]) called it "the
pathology of normalcy" and claimed it was
brought about through consensual validation.
5) Islamic fundamentalism. From the perspective
of the Islamists, his Islamic behaviour makes
him a moral person.  Living the dictates of Islam
makes him “good.” He does well, and he is
good. His ethical beliefs and actions find con-
sensual validation and continuous reinforcement
in any and every geographical area of the um-
ma.  He no longer doubts, no longer even won-
ders. In a crude sense, he knows who he is,
where he belongs, and what his purpose in life
is. He knows never to doubt. His is not to reason
why.  Besides, he has lost the will, if not the ca-
pacity. By Islamic standards, the most virulent
jihad is good. Jihadism is the ethical life of Is-
lam. The Islamist embraces it right down to the
last mitochondrion in the last cell of his
body.  He could not give up Islam even if he
wanted, and he never commits the perditious sin
of wanting.
2.1 Neutrosophic logic approach to validation 
For a logical approach to the validation of ideologies, 
we will use the Neutrosophic logic ([20], [26-32]) (See 
figure 1). 
Definition 2:  True IDS-image is the IDS-image which is 
permitted syntactically and semantically and whose
external evidence provides with a degree of truth value in 
its existence.  
Considering the neutrosophic principles we shall estab-
lish the following Axioms: 
Axiom 1: Any IDS-image IDSi is provided with a neutro-
sophic truth value, element of a neutrosophic set  E =] 
-0, 1+ [3.  non enumerable and stable for multiplication. 
Axiom 2: Any IDS-image IDSi is  provided  with  a  neu-
trosophic veritative  value  v   31,0  such that v =
V( )=V((T, I, F)), V reciprocal application of  E in 
 31,0  and which possesses the following properties: 
1) V(0) = -0.
2) V(1, 2) = V(1). V(2).
If T = 1+ it will designate absolute truth and if T= -0 
1 F + it will designate the absolute falseness of the
IDS-image. If complementariness is designated by Μ, the 
principle of complementariness between two IDs-images: 
IDSi and iIDS

, it there is iff (1 + 2)   31,0  . 
When 1  0 y 2  0, such that v (
k
i  M kjIDSi ) = 
0, it is necessary that 1 + 2 = 
-0, as the sum of verac-
ities does not admit opposing elements. 
Axiom 3: If IDSi  designates the non-IDS-
image IDSi , with the neutrosophic truth value , 
we will have to    1V .
Axiom 4: LIDSi /
     ))0,0,1((,,  FITVVv
Definition 3: Absolute true IDS-image TIDSi is 
the IDS-image that fulfill 
     ))0,0,1((,,  FITVVv
Let S be a Believer Subject. Let IDSi be a IDS-
image. We denote as Δ the operator a priori and the 
equivalence operator as  . We shall designate as 
)(   the equivalence a priori operator and as (□  ) 
the necessarily equivalent operator. We shall desig-
nate as V the true being operator and as □V the neces-
sarily true operator. We designate as F the false being 
operator. We shall designate the equivalent a posteri-
ori operator as .  We may establish the following 
Theorems: 
Theorem 1: Each absolute true IDS-image IDSi con-
sidered by S is equivalent a priori to a necessary IDs-
image IDSi* , that is,
IDSiIDSi * ( )( IDSi □ ).* IDSi
Proof: 
We shall consider the neutrosophic veritative value v 
  31,0   of a specific IDS-image IDSi which shall 
be T=1+ if it is true and T= -0  1F if it is false. 
Therefore  1TIDSi  is a priori by stipulation, 
and T = 1+ is necessary if IDSi is true and necessarily 
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false F = 1+ if ijr  is false. That is )( IDSi
k
i*
and  (□ iIDS* □ IDSi* ).
Theorem 2: Each absolute true IDS-image IDSi con-
sidered by S is necessarily equivalent to an a priori S-
image IDSi* : IDSiIDSi * ( IDSirij (□  ) 
IDSi* ). 
Proof: 
a) Given a true IDS-image IDSi we establish the
IDS-image IDSiA  for T = 1+ and such that
  IDSiIDSi A  VIDSi   □V IDSiA . If
IDSi has as neutrosophic veritative value T =
1+, then IDSiIDSi A  will have the same
neutrosophic veritative value, therefore
IDSi(□  ) IDSiIDSi A . Thus, we have
demonstrated that each true IDS-image is
necessarily equivalent IDS-image a priori,
specifically IDSiIDSi A . 
b) In the case of F ijr , the existence of a IDS-
image IDSi*  will be necessary such that
(IDSi(□  ) IDSi*  IDSi* ). For FIDSi
 F IDSiA  as 
( IDSiIDSi A )(□  ) IDSi  and therefore, 
due to this selection of IDSi*  there cannot
be (IDSi (□  ) IDSi* . For FIDSi, IDSi*  is
chosen, that is  ( IDSiIDSi A ). Thus, 
clearly there is (IDSi 
(□  ) IDSi*  IDSi* ) due to the selec-
tion of IDSi* . Therefore, Theorem 2 is
demonstrated.
Theorem 3: Each necessary IDS-image IDSi consid-
ered by S is equivalent a posteriori to an absolute true 
IDS-image IDSi* , that is, 
IDSiIDSi * (□ )( IDSi ).* IDSi  
Proof: 
If IDSi V   )0,0,1(  v  is necessary. 
□
  )1,0,0(/*)0,0,1(/*   vIDSivIDSiIDSi
. The second term )1,0,0(/* vrij  implies 
F ijr*  which contradicts Theorem 1 as the IDS-image
IDSi is true, being equivalent a priori to IDSi*  
which is necessary and therefore )0,0,1( v . 
Theorem 4: Each a posteriori IDS-image IDSi 
considered by S is necessarily equivalent to an abso-
lute true IDS-image IDSi* : 
IDSiIDi * ( IDSi (□  ) IDSi* ). 
Proof. 
If IDSi*  has )0,0,1( v as being true, it will 
imply 
that
 )1,0,0(/)0,0,1(/   vIDSivIDSi . 
For )0,0,1( v  it is obvious. For 
)1,0,0( v it contradicts Theorem 2. 
3 VARIABLES OF AN IDEOLOGY 
Ideologies "are" in the Superstructure, but far from 
our intention to think about neoplatonic ideas that beliefs 
exist per se, without material support. Without believers 
there is no belief system; but the belief system itself is 
not coextensive with any given individual Subject or set 
of Subjects. Ideologies as belief system have longer lives 
than Subjects and are capable of such complexity that 
they would exceed the capacity of a given Subject to de-
tail. Ideologies have the quality of being real and having 
strong consequences but having no specific location, be-
cause Superstructure has not a physical place. In accord-
ing to Rokeach ([33]), people make their inner feelings 
become real for others by expressing them in such cases 
as votes, statements, etc. they built or tear dhow, which in 
turn form the basis of cooperative (or uncooperative) ac-
tivity for humans, the result of which is “Reality”. Ideol-
ogy is one kind of Reality although not all of it. Ideolo-
gies, like units of energy (information), should be thought 
of as things which have variable, abstract characteristics, 
not as members of platonic categories based on similari-
ty. The ideological variables are: 
1) Interrelatedness of their substantive beliefs de-
fines the degree of an ideology (DId) and it is
defined like the number m of their logical ab-
stract relations. Logically, some belief systems
ideologies are more tightly interrelated than oth-
ers. We suppose the ideologies and belief sys-
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tems forming a continuum:  rl IdId ,..., .
Then: a) At the right end of the continuum are 
ideologies that consist of a few highly linked 
general statements from which a fairly large 
number of specific propositions can be derived. 
Confronted by a new situation, the believer may 
refer to the general rule to determine the stance 
he should take. Science considered as ideology 
is an example. b) At the left end of the continu-
um are ideologies that consists of sets of rather 
specific prescriptions and proscriptions (deonti-
cal norms) between which there are only weak 
functional links, although they may be loosely 
based on one or more assumptions. Confronted 
by a new situation, the believer receives little 
guidance from the belief system because there 
are no general rules to apply, only specific be-
havioral deontical norms that may not be rele-
vant to the problem at hand. Agrarian religions 
are typically of this type. They are not true ideo-
logies but proto-ideologies. If DId is defined by 
m or number of logical abstract relations be-
tween substantive beliefs, then m = 0 defines the 
non existence of belief system and m an 
ideal ideology that it contemplated understand-
ing of the totality, that is to say, of the own Re-
ality.  Consequences: a) High DId may inhibit 
diffusion. It may make an otherwise useful trait 
inaccessible or too costly by virtue of baggage 
that must accompany it. Scientific theories are 
understood by a small number of experts.  b) To 
DId is high, social control may be affected on 
the basis of sanctions and may be taught and 
learned. Ideologies with a relative high DId 
seem to rely on rather general internalized deon-
tical norms to maintain social control.  
2) The empirical relevance (ER) is the degree to
which individual substantive belief Sbi confront
the empirical world (Reality). The proposition
that the velocity is the space crossed by a mobile
divided by the time that takes in crossing that
space has high empirical relevance. The propo-
sition God’s existence has low empirical rele-
vance.  1,0ER , being 0 null empirical rele-
vance (Homo neaderthalensis lives at the mo-
ment) and 1 total empirical relevance (a + b =
c).  When beliefs lacking empirical relevance
arise in response to pressing strain in the eco-
nomic or political structures (SB), collective ac-
tion to solve economic or political problems be-
comes unlikely. Lack of ER protects the ideolo-
gy and the social vehicle from controversies
arising between the highly differentiated popula-
tions of believers.
3) The ideological function is the actual utility for
a group of believing subjects. Ideological func-
tion conditions the persistence of the ideology,
or time that is useful or influences social struc-
ture.
4) The degree of the willingness of an ideology
(WD) is the degree to which an ideology accepts
or rejects innovations.  1,0WD  being WD
=  0 null acceptance and WD = 1 total ac-
ceptance.  To major consequence of WD to take
innovations is the ease with which ideologies
adapt changes in their social environment. Be-
liefs with 1WD , accepting innovations of all
ideological degrees survive extreme changes in
social structure: Shinto in Japan or Roman Ca-
tholicism is examples.
5) The degree of tolerance of an ideology (TD) is
the degree with an ideology accepts or rejects
competing ideologies or beliefs systems.
 1,0TD  being TD =  0 total rejection  and
TD = 1 total acceptance. Some accepts all others
as equally valid but simply different explana-
tions of reality 1TD  . Others reject all other
ideology as evil 0TD , and maintain a posi-
tion such as one found in revolutionary or fun-
damentalist movements. Then: a) High TD
seems to be independent of ideological system
and the degree of the willingness (WD). b) Low
TD is fairly strong related with WD. c) Low TD
is fairly strong related with a high ER. Rele-
vance of highly empirical beliefs to each other is
so clear. Therefore 





 ER
WD
fTD ,
1
. TD 
has consequences for the ideology: 1) It affects 
the case with the organizational vehicle (social 
structure) may take alignments with other social 
structures. 2) It affects the social relationships of 
the believers.  
6) The degree of commitment demanded by an ide-
ology (DCD) is the intensity of commitment
demanded to the believer by the part of the ide-
ology or the type of social vehicle by which the
ideology is carried.  1,0DCD  being DCD
=  0 null commitment demanded and DCD = 1
total adhesion. Then: a) DCD is not dependent
of ideological system ID, empirical relevance
(ER), acceptance or innovation (WD) and toler-
ance (TD). b) The degree of commitment de-
manded (DCD) has consequences for the persis-
tence of the ideology. If an ideology has
1DCD  and cannot motivate the believers to
make this commitment, it is not likely to persist
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for very long. Intentional communities having 
like immediate objective utopias have typically 
failed in large part for this reason. Revolutionary 
and fundamentalist ideologies typically demand 
DCD = 1 of their believers and typically insti-
tute procedures, such as party names to both en-
sure and symbolize that commitment (Cross-
man, [34]). c) DCD depends of invalidation. 
Ideological systems with low DCD fail or are 
invalidated slowly as beliefs drops from the be-
lievers’ repertoire one by one or are relegated to 
some inactive status. Invalidation of ideological 
systems with high DCD produces apostates. 
High DCD ideological systems seem to become 
invalidated in a painful explosion for their be-
lievers, and such ideologies are replaced by an 
equally high DCD to an ideology opposing the 
original one. But reality is not constructed. Real-
ity is encountered and then modified. Human 
Subjects do, in fact, encounter each other in 
pairs or groups in situations that require them to 
interact and to develop beliefs and ideologies in 
the process. They do so, however, as socialized 
beings with language, including all its values in 
fact, logic, prescriptions and proscriptions; in 
the context of the previous work of others; and 
constrained by endless social restrictions on al-
ternative courses of action. Commitment is focus 
of ideologies, because is focus Ideas may be 
good, true, or beautiful in some context of 
meaning but their goodness, truth, or beauty is 
not sufficient explanation for its existence, 
sharedness, or perpetuation through time. Ideol-
ogy is the ground and texture of cultural consen-
sus. In its narrowest sense, this may be a con-
sensus of a marginal or maverick group. In the 
broad sense in which we use the term ideology 
is the system of interlinked ideas, symbols, and 
beliefs by which any culture seeks to justify and 
perpetuate itself; the web of rhetoric, ritual, and 
assumption through which society coerces, per-
suades, and coheres on those aspects of social 
structure which maintain or create commitment: 
limitation of alternatives, social isolation, and 
social insulation through strategies that dictate 
heavy involvement of the individual Subject in 
group-centered activities. Individual commit-
ment is view as stemming either from learning 
and reinforcements for what is learned, or from 
the fact that ideological functions (actual utility) 
to maintain personality either by compensating 
for some feeling of inadequacy, by providing an 
object for dependence, or by producing order 
out of disorder (Fromm, 1941; Wallace, 1966). 
Commitments are validated (or made legitimate) 
by mechanisms that make them subjectively 
meaningful to Subjects (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966). 
7) The external quality (EQ) of an ideology ([21])
is the property by which ideologies seem to be-
lievers, to transcend the social groups that carry
them, to have an independent existence of their
own.
Then we propose the following definition: 
Definition 3: Ideological system Id during the time 
of its actual utility  wtt ,0  or historical time is a non-
linear function of its main characteristics, such as Id = 
f(DId, ER, WD, TD, DCD) = f(DId, ER, WD, f’(1/WD, 
ER), DCD) = F(DId, ER,WD, DCD).  
An ideology varies in the ideological degree (IdD) 
and its empirical relevance (ER) or the extent to which 
this ideology pertain directly o empirical reality. The ap-
parent elusiveness of an ideology derives from four 
characteristics, all of which result from the fact that 
while beliefs are created and used by humans, they also 
have properties that are independent of their human use. 
In according with Borhek and Curtis ([23]) 
1) Ideologies appear to their believers to have a
stability, immutability, coherence and inde-
pendence. Ideologies to appear to social group
members as a suprasocial set of eternal verities,
unchangeable thorough mere human action and
agreed upon by all right-thinking people not be-
cause the verities belong to a believers but be-
cause they are true ([21]). In reality, beliefs are
changeable.
2) Similarities among substantive beliefs are not
necessary parallel structural similarities among
ideologies.
3) The historic source of beliefs (the myth) may,
by virtue of their original use, endow them with
features that remain through millennia of
change and particularly fit them to use in novel
context.
4) The most important commonality among a set
of substantive beliefs is the social structure.
3 CONCLUSIONS 
We can draw the following conclusions: 
1) Therefore an ideology is a set of beliefs, aims
and ideas.
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2) Ideologies are not a collection of accidental facts
considered separately and referred an underlying
history and it is: a) Thoughts about our own be-
haviors, lives and courses of action. b) A mental
impression – something that is abstract in our
heads – rather than a concrete thing. c) A system
of belief. Just beliefs –non-unchangeable ulti-
mate truths about the way the world should be.
3) Ideology has different meanings:
1) The process of production of meanings,
signs and values in social life.
2) A body of ideas characteristic of a par-
ticular social group or class.
3) Ideas that help to legitimate a dominant
political power.
4) Socially necessary illusion; the conjec-
ture of discourse and power.
5) The medium in which conscious social
actors make sense of their reality.
6) Action oriented set of beliefs.
7) The confusion of linguistic and phe-
nomenal reality.
8) Semiotic closure.
9) The indispensable medium in which
individuals live out their relations to a
social structure.
10) The confusion of the process whereby
social life is converted to a natural.
4) The greater is the ideological degree (Id), the
greater is the negative evidence for the whole
ideology.
5) The less the degree of empirical relevance, the
less the importance of external evidence (pres-
sure of events, but the greater the importance of
external evidence.
6) The suprasocial form of an ideology derives
most significantly from its abstract ideal form
belonging to Mythical Superstructure. The cur-
rent social influence of an ideology derives of its
concrete form belonging to Doxical Superstruc-
ture.
7) The more systematic and empirically relevant an
ideology is, the greater the feasibility of
preserving it as an abstract ideal apart from a
given concrete expression.
8) The greater the Ideological degree (DId) and the
greater the degree of empiricism, the less the re-
liance on internal evidence and the greater the
reliance of external evidence.
9) The extent of commitment to ideology varies di-
rectly with the amount of consensual validation
available, and inversely with the pressure of
events.
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